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ABSTRACT 
  
 The Financials Accounting Standards Board (FASB) mandated the expensing of 
stock options with FAS 123 (R).  As of March 2006, 749 companies had accelerated the 
vesting of their employee stock options and avoided a reduction in their reported profits 
that otherwise would have occurred under the new standard.  There are many different 
motives for the acceleration strategy, and the focus of this study is to determine whether 
shareholders viewed these motives as either positive or negative.  A favorable return 
subsequent to an acceleration announcement would signify that shareholder’s viewed 
management’s motives as positive.  An unfavorable return subsequent to an acceleration 
announcement would signify that shareholder’s viewed management’s motives as 
negative.  The evidence from this study suggests that shareholders reacted favorably, on 
average, to acceleration announcements.  However, these results lack statistical 
significance and are based on a small sample, thus, they should be interpreted with 
caution.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
 The passing of FAS 123 (R) in December 2004 was the culmination of a great 
deal of controversy regarding the treatment of stock options.  The new standard enacted 
by FASB requires that firms expense stock awards over their vesting period.  Prior to this 
standard, firms were allowed to simply disclose the anticipated stock option expense 
among the footnotes of their financial statements.  FAS 123 (R) would require that the 
associated expense now be listed on the face of the income statement and therefore 
reduce reported operating profits.  In order to avoid booking millions in stock options 
expenses, hundreds of firms chose to accelerate the vesting periods of their employee 
stock options (ESOs).  By accelerating the vesting periods, these firms ensured that the 
associated stock option expense would never be booked on their income statements.  
According to a Bear Sterns report, 749 companies accelerated the vesting of their stock 
options in anticipation of adopting FAS 123 (R) with an estimated $6 billion in expense 
disappearing from future income statements.1  However, not every company that faced 
increased compensation expenses chose to accelerate their vesting periods.  It is 
important to learn the motives of the accelerating companies and also the repercussions 
of their actions.   
The acceleration of stock options is intriguing because, at first, it appears to be a 
successful approach to avoid the very expenses that FAS 123 (R) would require.  Some 
might view these actions as a devious way to avoid recording an otherwise required 
expense, thus tarnishing the company’s image to current and potential investors.  Also, 
investors may wonder why a company would want to conceal such expenses and perhaps 
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convey an inaccurate financial standing.  Inferences could then be made about how 
forthcoming management was about other significant issues. Some have cited this 
acceleration as an act of “accounting gimmickry.”  If investors agree with this 
characterization, then they will react unfavorably to the acceleration announcement. 
 However, most CEOs claim that the acceleration was in the best interest of their 
companies.  Eliminating these expenses would help to avoid violating debt covenants and 
meet earnings benchmarks.  If shareholders believe that management is acting in the best 
interest of the company, then they will react favorably when the acceleration 
announcement is made.  However, if shareholders feel that management is simply 
employing tactics to hide necessary expenses, they will respond unfavorably and the 
company’s stock price will reflect these beliefs.  My research aims to provide evidence 
on shareholders’ perceptions of managements’ motives by analyzing stock price reactions 
to acceleration announcements.  
The state of the options, underwater or in the money, is a potentially important 
factor.  I examine whether the market’s reaction is influenced by the state of the options 
that were accelerated.  Since underwater stock options are of lesser value to employees, it 
is argued that they should never be regarded as expenses due to the unlikelihood that they 
will ever be exercised.  Management hopes that investors are aware of this and therefore 
will react positively to their acceleration.  I investigate whether the market’s reaction is a 
function of the state of the options.   
Another factor that could potentially affect the market’s reaction is the amount 
accelerated as a percentage of market capitalization.  My sample is comprised of the 64 
largest accelerators in terms of expense avoided.  Scaling the amount of expense 
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accelerated by each company’s market capitalization results in more comparable figures 
across firms of different sizes.  The larger the percentage accelerated the larger the 
expected market reaction.  I examine whether the market’s reaction to the announcement 
is a function of this percentage.   
My empirical results are inconclusive as to whether option acceleration is to the 
benefit or detriment of shareholders.  I find an average abnormal stock return of 0.05% 
for the days surrounding the acceleration announcements, but this amount is not 
statistically distinguishable from zero.  I also fail to find compelling evidence that the 
market’s reaction is a function of the state of the options at the time of acceleration.  I 
find no significant correlation between the returns for these underwater and in the money 
options. Table 4 seems to suggest a difference in the returns provided, but only 6 
observations of in the money option acceleration make it difficult to get statistical 
significance.  Lastly, I do not find compelling evidence that the market’s reaction is a 
function of the amount of expense accelerated as a percentage of market capitalization.  I 
find no significant correlation between the amount accelerated and the abnormal returns 
during the three day window surrounding the announcement.  The results of this study are 
explained in greater detail in the sections that follow.   
 
History of FAS 123 (R)  
 During the 1970s, ESOs were a new form of employee compensation and FASB 
was not yet sure how they should be treated.  In 1972, the Accounting Principles Board 
(APB) issued Opinion 25 which stated that the expenses of ESOs be reported only if the 
exercise price was less than the stock price at the grant date. This became known as the 
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intrinsic value method.  Since most companies issued options at or above market price, 
these expenses were generally not reported on income statements.  This resulted in 
millions of ESOs being issued within the next 30 years and none of the corresponding 
compensation expense being recorded.  The APB justified their ruling by stating that no 
reliable method for calculating an accurate compensation expense existed.  The Black-
Scholes formula would be published just one year later, yet this accounting treatment 
would be allowed for more than 3 decades.2 Technology related and entrepreneurial start 
up companies reaped the largest benefits from this accounting treatment.   
 The tech boom grew stronger through the next few decades, and is attributed with 
causing the market bubble of the 1990s and also its subsequent burst. Many blamed the 
absence of compensation costs from financials as a contributing factor to their 
inaccuracy.  FASB decided to revisit the issue in hopes of improving financial statement 
accuracy.  In October 1995, FAS 123 was issued which “encouraged” companies to use 
the fair-value method of reporting, but still allowed usage of the intrinsic value method.  
FAS 123 was intended to supersede APB 25, but both industry and congressional 
pressure persuaded FASB to issue this comparably weaker stance. Nearly every company 
chose to maintain the intrinsic value method, and their corresponding stock option 
expense remained hidden amongst their financial statement footnotes.   
 The accounting scandals during the beginning of the 21st Century brought 
financial statement transparency to the attention of FASB once again.  This time, they 
would not succumb to congressional or tech lobby pressure.  The passing of Sarbanes-
Oxley in 2002 gave FASB more power and independence, no longer forcing it to rely on 
voluntary contributions from public companies and accounting firms.  These preceding 
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factors led FASB to issue FAS 123 (R) in March of 2004.  This standard requires all 
companies to recognize compensation expense related to ESOs at their fair market value.  
The options are to be expensed over their vesting period, which typically lasts three to 
five years. Though this statement was three decades in the making, it was still met with 
resistance.  By treating stock options as an income-reducing expense, some companies’ 
earnings would have dropped as much as 6 percent in 2004 and 8 percent in 2003, 
according to Credit Suisse First Boston.  Congressional pressures persisted as well.  Five 
senators, led by Barbara Boxer, attempted to pass a bill in March of 2004 that would 
require a full assessment of the costs and benefits of the expensing of all stock options 
before the new FASB standard would be enforced by the SEC.  This bill would 
potentially push back the mandatory expensing of options for 3 more years.  Senator 
Boxer, from California, had a large stake in the passing of 123 (R) because the hundreds 
of options-loving Silicon Valley companies in her state would suffer the greatest if the 
statement was passed. Contention was also heard from hundreds of others who fiercely 
contested any changes to the current rules.  According to the same CSFB study, as of 
January 2005, 77% of the S&P 500 still employed the intrinsic value method and 
recognized no stock option expense.  The financials of these 383 companies would have 
to undergo large changes since the fair value method would be required.   FASB would 
not back down this time though.  Boxer’s bill eventually failed and the new rule was 
adopted in December 2004 and would require companies to begin expensing during their 
first reporting period after June 15, 2005. 
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Justification for Mandating the Expensing of Options   
 FASB cited four main reasons for issuing 123 (R). The first reason was to address 
the concerns of financial statement users.  They noted that since the accounting scandals 
of Enron and WorldCom, users were more wary then ever about the accuracy of financial 
statements.  FASB intended to improve transparency by requiring expensing which 
would more accurately reflect the economic consequences that issuing ESOs has on a 
company.   
 The second reason for issuing the statement was to improve comparability of 
financial information among companies.  At the time of issuance, some companies were 
using the intrinsic method and others the fair value method.  This created problems when 
investors were attempting to easily compare the financials of two companies.  In order to 
accurately compare the profits of two companies, an investor would have to search their 
footnotes for any compensation expenses that would affect the company’s profits.   
 The third reason was related to the premise of improving financial reporting 
simplicity.  FASB also wanted to simplify U.S GAAP with the passing of FAS 123 (R).  
They wanted to require all companies to follow the same accounting standard, without 
the option of using Opinion 25’s intrinsic value method.  U.S GAAP has been criticized 
as being confusing, so FASB has been making strides to improve simplicity.   
 The final reason that FASB stated for its passing the statement was to converge 
with international accounting standards.  In February 2004, the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) issued IFRS 2 which requires that all associated entities 
recognize compensation expense under the fair value method.  Since members of the EU 
and other important trade concerns conform to IAS, the U.S has been taking steps 
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towards convergence for many years.   FASB wanted to ensure that the U.S. did not fall 
behind with regards to any new accounting policies and also that American financials 
would be easily comparable to international ones.  This would also help ease the burden 
placed on companies who report financials under both U.S GAAP and IASB standards.   
 
Responses to the Issuance of FAS 123 (R)  
 Upon the mandating of expensing options in December 2004, companies had the 
choice of taking three different paths.  The first, obviously, was to begin expensing 
during their first financial period following June 15, 2005.   
 Another path taken by hundreds of companies was the early adoption of the fair 
value expensing method.  Coke was one of the first companies to voluntarily begin 
expensing their ESOs.  Under persuasion from their largest shareholder, Warren E. 
Buffet, Coke began employing the fair value method during the fourth quarter of 2002.  
Buffet believed that companies that chose to adopt FAS 123 early would, “develop a 
reputation for being believable, for not hyping things, and will be valued more than those 
whose CEO is flim-flamming (investors).” 3  This is probably why Gillette and The 
Washington Post Co., two companies that also boast Buffet as a member of their board, 
decided to adopt early as well.  The New York Times Co. also decided to adopt early but 
cited a different reason for doing so.  Their Vice President of Corporate Communications, 
Catherine Mathis, stated, “We decided to adopt FAS 123 (R) early because we wanted to 
reflect the charges at the beginning of the year and felt it was good corporate governance 
to do so.” 4  If the best corporate governance would be participating in early adoption, 
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then why did some companies choose to go down a different path?  There were obviously 
benefits to be reaped by companies that chose to accelerate rather than adopt early.   
 The third path, the one on which this paper focuses, was to accelerate the vesting 
period of options.  Since the vesting period would be completed before 123 (R) took 
effect, the related compensation expense would avoid the income statement.  The 749 
companies from the Bear Stearns report who chose to accelerate options would be able to 
list their entire compensation expense within their footnotes with no contention from the 
SEC. This seems to be a popular strategy amongst technology companies in particular.  
Of the 749 companies that chose to accelerate, 33% of them were from the technology 
sector.  In my sample 55% of the 62 largest accelerators are technology companies.  The 
technology industry’s eagerness to hand out ESOs in the 1990s has been blamed by some 
for the stock bubble around the same time, and also the resulting burst.  Technology 
companies presumably stood to suffer the most from expensing so it is unsurprising that 
they comprise the largest percentage of the acceleration population.  Healthcare 
companies ranked second in frequency comprising 21% of my sample.   My research 
aims to determine the motives of management for choosing this response to statement 
123 (R).  To provide evidence on shareholders’ perceptions I investigate the market’s 
reaction to acceleration announcements. 
 
Motives for Acceleration  
 Managers may have numerous motives for choosing the acceleration strategy over 
the other available options.  Positive motives should be associated with positive abnormal 
returns.  In these cases, investors will assume that management is acting in the 
 9 
shareholders’ best interests and react favorably to the acceleration announcement.  
Negative abnormal returns should be attributed negative motives of management.  In 
these cases, investors will react unfavorably to the announcements and assume that 
management is not acting in the shareholders’ best interests.  An example of a positive 
motive would be to keep expenses as low as possible in order to increase reported profits.  
If this was perceived to be management’s motive, then shareholders would react 
positively because it would seem that they were acting in a way to improve or maintain 
the company’s stock price.  This would be beneficial for the shareholder’s investment and 
they would react perhaps by purchasing more stock, thus raising the stock price.  
Sometimes the perception that management is accelerating vesting just to increase 
reported profits can also be viewed as a negative motive.  Such actions could potentially 
increase managements’ bonuses and therefore cost shareholders’ money.  This example 
highlights how important shareholders’ perceptions are because the same act can be 
viewed in two drastically different ways.   
 Another motive that would be viewed in a positive light would be accelerating 
vesting in order to avoid violating debt covenants.  Many debt covenants are dependent 
upon the working capital of a company.  If expenses increase drastically, then the 
company may fall below the required working capital amount and creditors would be 
able to demand immediate repayment.  This would be detrimental for both management 
and shareholders.  Hence, if investors perceived the motive to be to maintain debt 
covenants, they would react positively.  
 Many companies chose to accelerate only “underwater” stock options, a tendency 
that I discuss in detail in the next section.  Many of these options were well underwater 
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and posed a very slim chance to ever become profitable.  Some see the acceleration of 
significantly underwater options as a positive motive and an action that will benefit the 
company.  The CEO of Linear Technology, Lothar Maier, chose to accelerate his 
company’s options that were well underwater claiming that, “Acceleration may have a 
positive effect on employee morale, retention, and perception of option value.” 5  Though 
it was extremely unlikely that the options would ever be profitable, Maier hoped that his 
employees would view them as such since he was giving them the right to exercise years 
ahead of schedule.  Accelerating in order to improve employee morale and give them 
something with a negligible economic cost may be viewed as a positive motive.   
 There are also perceived negative motives that would cause an investor to react 
negatively to the announcement of acceleration.  Since ESOs are granted in order to 
improve employee retention and motivation, acceleration essentially removes associated 
benefits.  With their options fully vested, employees would be free to leave the company 
and exercise their options whenever they please.  ESOs also aim to align the interests of 
employees and investors.  If employees leave the company due to the advanced vesting of 
their options, they will no longer be working for the benefits of the investors.  
Shareholders will be skeptical about why the company is willing to forfeit all the 
associated benefits that stock options give them in the first place.  They may perceive the 
costs of acceleration as being irrationally high and hence react negatively to the 
announcement. 
 Another perceived negative motive would be management’s desire to reduce 
transparency.  The recent accounting scandals have raised issues about the transparency 
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of financial statements and some investors may view this acceleration as yet another way 
to manage a company’s earnings.  The perception that management would engage in 
earnings management to intentionally inflate their profits would influence negative 
reactions to acceleration.  As noted before, this assumption that acceleration is performed 
to increase reported profits can be viewed in both a negative and positive light to 
investors.  There is also belief amongst some investors that managers will always choose 
accounting policies that benefit themselves and not shareholders.  Investors with such 
beliefs will automatically attribute acceleration to negative motives by management. 
 
The Effect of “Underwater” Stock Options  
 As mentioned earlier, many firms chose to accelerate only options that were well 
underwater, meaning that the strike price for these options was well above the market 
price on the date of acceleration.  Of the 749 accelerators, 84% advanced the vesting of 
underwater options only.  In my study, 90% of the largest 62 accelerators advanced only 
underwater options as well.  There is a debate over whether these underwater options 
should even be considered as expenses, given the unlikely chances that they will ever 
become profitable to those holding them.  Julia Harper, CFO of RasiSys feels that, 
“Options like these that are underwater will never get exercised- our employees view 
them as having no value, we view them as having no value, yet (under the rule) you’re 
going to be running them through your income statement as if they had value.”6   Most 
companies who chose to accelerate the vesting of such options view their strategy as a 
way to avoid an unnecessary expense for options that are likely to never be exercised.  
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They also rely on savvy, informed investors to read the footnotes of their financials to 
learn about the status of their accelerated options.  Given that investors understand the 
implausibility of these options ever being cashed in, then they will understand why 
accelerating their vesting is in the best interest of the company and is not intended to 
deceive.  However, given the non-zero probability that these options may become 
profitable, they should not be considered completely worthless.   
 
Prior Academic Literature 
 Previous studies have been conducted that focus on the effects of stock options 
acceleration prior to the passing of FAS 123 (R).  Balsam, Reitenga and Yin (2007) find a 
positive association between stock returns and the announcement to accelerate.  An 
average abnormal return of positive 0.524 percent was attributed to the three-day window 
surrounding the announcement.  They claim that the accelerated vesting of options is a 
form of earnings management that benefits equity investors.  This is the only previous 
study, though, that finds a positive association between stock price and acceleration 
announcements. 
 Negative stock price reactions surrounding announcement dates are reported by 
Choudhary, Rajgopal, and Ventachalam (2006). They claim this negative market reaction 
is value-destroying for the firms and exemplifies poor corporate governance.  
Management succeeded in increasing their reported earnings by an average of 2.3%, but 
at the cost of displeasing investors.  They also attribute a decrease of 1% in market 
capitalization to the decision to accelerate vesting. 
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 Elayan, Meyer, and Li (2006) find that acceleration does not benefit shareholders 
like its proponents have claimed.  They conclude that the decision to accelerate was made 
specifically for management’s own self interest and simultaneously made their own 
options more valuable.    
 All three of these previous studies used different parameters, measurements, and 
econometric models to come to their very different conclusions.  Since all provided such 
different results, I feel that it is necessary to conduct more research into this topic to 
determine the true effects of acceleration.  My tests will differ from the three 
aforementioned studies and I hope to obtain my own conclusions on the topic of option 
acceleration and how it affected shareholder equity. 
 
Hypotheses  
 My primary hypothesis relates to how the market reacts upon learning the firm’s 
decisions to accelerate vesting periods.  When the firms announce their intentions to 
accelerate, investors will be reacting to this information.  As I have previously stated, 
investors believing that there are positive motives for accelerating will respond favorably 
while those believing that there are negative motives behind the acceleration will respond 
unfavorably.  This leads to my first hypothesis, which is stated in the null form: 
 H1: The acceleration of ESO vesting periods in anticipation of FAS 123 (R) is not 
       associated with changes in stockholder’s equity.  
 
 While overall trends will be important to identify, it is possible that other factors 
also affected how the market responded to the acceleration announcements.   The 
argument that “underwater” stock options have little to no value may play a role in the 
reaction of the market when such options are accelerated.  The argument has been made 
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that informed and savvy investors will be aware of the value of “underwater” stock 
options and thus respond to their acceleration in a less negative manner.  Contrarily, 
companies who choose to accelerate in-the-money options will face less positive 
reactions from their investors.  In the second of my tests, I examine whether or not the 
acceleration of entirely “underwater” options leads to different returns than those of 
companies who decided to accelerate in-the-money options.  This leads to my second 
hypothesis, which is stated in the null form: 
 H2: The acceleration of “underwater” ESOs is not associated with different 
 returns than the acceleration of entirely in-the-money options.   
 
 Another factor that may affect how the market responds to option acceleration is 
the amount that a firm has decided to accelerate.  A firm that decides to accelerate an 
especially large amount of options may face different reactions than one that chooses to 
only accelerate a comparably smaller amount.  For this study, I obtain data on the 64 
largest monetary accelerators but not the largest in terms of percentage of market 
capitalization.  In my third test, I account for each firm’s market capitalization when 
examining their stock returns for the associated period.  I measure the amount of 
compensation expense that the firms have accelerated and calculate this amount as a 
percentage of market capitalization.  This scales all of the companies’ acceleration 
amounts with respect to their overall company size.  Companies that accelerate a larger 
expense as it relates to their market cap are likely to face larger market reactions than 
those who accelerated correspondingly smaller percentages.   This leads to my third 
hypothesis, which is also stated in the null form: 
 H3:  The amount of options accelerated, as it relates to market capitalization, is  
          not associated with shareholders’ responses to acceleration announcements.  
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Description of Sample  
 Due to the costly nature of hand-collecting data, my study examines only the 
acceleration and resulting market responses of the 64 largest monetary accelerators.  I 
identified these companies from a Bear Stearns report by McConnell, Pegg, Senyek, and 
Mott.  Each company in my sample accelerated at least $20 million in compensation 
expense with the largest accelerator being Sun Microsystems who accelerated $400 
million.  Of the 64 companies in my sample, I am only able to conduct empirical tests on 
62 of them due to an inability to locate 2 of the companies’ acceleration dates.  The New 
York Times stated in their 2004 10Q that they chose to accelerate options in June 2004, 
but did not designate the specific date.  Since my tests rely upon a three day window 
surrounding the acceleration announcement, I omit the New York Times from my tests to 
avoid any inaccuracy that an unspecific date would bring to my results.  I was also unable 
to locate the acceleration date of Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries ltd.  Teva was involved 
in a merger with IVAX Corporation, a fellow accelerator, on July 25, 2005 which makes 
pinpointing their acceleration date difficult.  Table 1 provides a complete listing of the 
companies used in this study. 
 The industry composition of my study sample is similar to the Bear Stearns 749 
company population.  Information Technology companies comprised 55% of my sample 
with Healthcare companies comprising 21%.  This is similar to the entire Bear Stearns 
population with Information Technology and Healthcare companies comprising 33% and 
19%, respectively (see Table 2).  Since ESO programs were most popular among 
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technology companies, it is not surprising that they comprise the largest percentage of the 
accelerator population. 
 My sample is also similar regarding the percentage of companies that decided to 
accelerate underwater options.  10% of my sample accelerated in-the-money options 
while 16% of the entire population did the same.  If a company did choose to accelerate 
in the money options, they would be required to record an expense equal to the intrinsic 
value of the options during the period of acceleration.  Also, when in the money options 
are accelerated, employees could potentially exercise them immediately and leave the 
company.  For these reasons, it is not surprising that most companies chose to only 
accelerate underwater options.   
 
Testing  
 For my testing, I designate a three day window surrounding each acceleration 
announcement.  To find the acceleration dates for all of the companies, I use a Lexis-
Nexis search to locate the 8K’s where the announcements were made.  Within each 8K, it 
is noted when each company’s board approved the proposal to accelerate options, which 
is the same day that they became exercisable.  I use this date as the acceleration date and 
use the trading days before and after (-1, +1) to form a three day window.  I then use 
CRSP to obtain stock returns for each company’s three day window and also the 
corresponding market returns for the same timeframe.  I compound these returns to buy-
and-hold returns over the three day window: 
3 day buy-and-hold return = [(1 + R 
-1) * (1 + R 0) * (1+ R 1)] -1 
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 I then subtract the compounded market return from this figure to get the abnormal return 
for each stock over the three day window surrounding the acceleration announcement.  I 
then obtain the mean and t-statistic of the abnormal returns.   
 Next, I test if the abnormal returns are a function of the state of the options at the 
time of acceleration.  I separated the returns into two categories: in the money and 
underwater.  Then I perform a two sample t-test to obtain the mean abnormal return for 
each category, getting the t-statistic, and the corresponding p-value.  A high t-statistic 
signifies that the mean of the abnormal returns were a function of the state of the options 
at the time of acceleration.  The p-value indicates the statistical significance of the t-test.  
A significant p-value, less than 0.05, would show that there is considerable evidence in 
the data to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternate hypothesis, with 95% 
confidence.  Thus, the closer the p-value is to zero, the more confident I can be about 
rejecting the null hypothesis.  
 The last test I perform is a regression of abnormal returns on the amount of stock 
options accelerated as a percentage of market capitalization.  I perform this regression to 
determine if abnormal returns were a function of how large of a percentage each 
company accelerated. In theory, investors would react more to a larger percentage being 
accelerated than they would to a smaller percentage being accelerated.  The larger the 
amount being vested immediately would mean that a larger amount of expense would 
never hit the income statement. According to many investors, the more expense that was 
accelerated, the more the transparency of the company’s financials was disrupted.  This 
view that transparency was reduced would cause investors to react negatively to large 
acceleration announcements.  If investors have the alternate view, that acceleration is 
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positive, then they will react more positively to large acceleration announcements. The R-
square from the regression reflects the fit of the line to the plot of returns and their 
corresponding acceleration percentages.  The higher the R-square, the higher the 
explanatory power of the model. 
 
Results 
 Table 3 provides the mean abnormal return for my entire sample, 0.05%, and the 
median of 0.09%.  The t-statistic that I calculate is 0.082.  The corresponding p-value, 
0.934, shows that there is not considerable evidence in the data to reject the null 
hypothesis.  Thus, I do not find compelling evidence that the acceleration of ESO vesting 
periods causes changes in shareholders’ equity and cannot reject H1.  
 Table 4 provides the mean abnormal returns for accelerated options that were 
underwater and those that were in-the-money.  Underwater options had a mean abnormal 
return of 0.55% while the mean abnormal return of in-the-money options was -4.62%.  
There is a large discrepancy between these two returns, however, since there were only 6 
in-the-money observations, the difference should be interpreted with caution.  By 
removing the in-the-money options from the sample, the mean return jumped from 0.05% 
to 0.55%.  The high p-value of this test, 0.34, indicates that there is not considerable 
evidence in the data to reject the null hypothesis.  I do not find compelling evidence that 
the abnormal returns were a function of the state of the options at the time of 
acceleration, and thus cannot reject H2.   
 Figure 1 provides a plot of all the abnormal returns that have been scaled to 
account for each company’s market capitalization.  There is an apparent slight trend of 
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increasing returns as the percent accelerated increases.  Though this trend is visible, it is 
not statistically significant due to the low R-square (found in Table 5).  Since the           
R-square is so small, 0.015, the explanatory power of my model is low and the trend line 
can not be applied to the entire population.  I do not find compelling evidence that the 
amount of expense accelerated, as it relates to market capitalization, is associated with 
shareholder’s responses to acceleration announcements.  Due to these findings, I cannot 
reject H3.   
  
Summary & Conclusion 
 In this paper, I examine the effect of the acceleration of stock options in the 
anticipation of FAS 123 (R) has on shareholder equity.  The purpose of this standard was 
to improve transparency of financial statements and also force companies to account for 
what was viewed by many to be a real expense.  The strategy of option acceleration taken 
by hundreds of companies was driven by many different motives which were discussed 
earlier.  This study aimed to determine what shareholder’s perceived managements’ 
motives to be; positive returns would be associated with positive motive perceptions and 
negative returns would be associated with negative motive perceptions.  However, I did 
not find any compelling empirical evidence on the effect that acceleration announcements 
had on shareholder equity.  Also, I did not find any empirical evidence on whether the 
state of options or scaled acceleration amounts swayed shareholder responses.  For these 
reasons, I cannot reject any of my three null hypotheses.   
 By testing a sample of only 62 companies, this made finding statistically 
significant results difficult from the beginning.  My small sample of the largest monetary 
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accelerators has failed to provide any results that can be attributed to the entire 
acceleration population.  To improve the testing that I have performed, I would use the 
entire 749 company population and perform the same tests.  This would provide more 
accurate results and I would see clearly how option acceleration affected shareholder 
equity.  Testing the entire population would also provide more confidence in how 
shareholder’s responded to the state of options and also the amount accelerated.   
 Another factor that could have affected my testing was the small three day 
window that I used.  A larger window may have provided market reactions that occurred 
greater than one day subsequent to the acceleration announcement.  Also, the news of the 
acceleration could have possibly leaked before it took affect so it would be beneficial to 
look at the stock returns of multiple days prior to the announcement as well.  This larger 
window could provide larger shareholder response and therefore more significant results. 
 The results in this paper contribute to our understanding of how option 
acceleration affected shareholder equity for the 62 largest monetary accelerators.  Due to 
the lack of empirical evidence that I obtained, these results can not be applied to the 
entire acceleration population.  Replicating my tests on a much larger sample appears to 
be a fruitful avenue for future research.   
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Charts/ Graphs 
Table 1 
 
Company Ticker Industry 
Expense 
Accelerated 
Acceleration 
 Date 
Underwater 
Options? 
1 SUNW Technology $400  May 4, 2005 YES 
2 ADI Technology 188 October 20, 2005 YES 
3 JPM Financials 149 December 16, 2005 YES 
4 AMAT Technology 138 August 5, 2005 YES 
5 FLEX Technology 121 January 21, 2005 YES 
6 FDC Technology 120 December 22, 2005 NO 
7 MCK Health Care 117 March 31, 2004 YES 
8 IRF Technology 106 April 19, 2005 NO 
9 MU Technology 100 April 6, 2005 YES 
10 NWS Consumer 100 May 5, 2005 YES 
11 SBL Technology 100 August 26, 2005 YES 
12 BIIB Health Care 96 December 12, 2005 YES 
13 JBL Technology 85 February 2, 2005 YES 
14 HCA Health Care 83 December 16, 2004 YES 
15 JDSU Technology 80 June 28, 2005 YES 
16 Q Technology 80 August 24, 2005 YES 
17 LLTC Technology 75 January 21, 2005 YES 
18 CMCSA Consumer 74 January 6, 2005 YES 
19 IR  Industrials 68 December 9, 2005 NO 
20 ABI Health Care 67 January 25, 2005 YES 
21 AV Technology 62 July 25, 2005 YES 
22 UVN Consumer 59 September 20, 2005 YES 
23 WMI Industrials 55 December 21, 2005  NO 
24 MOGN Health Care 54.3 July 29, 2005 YES 
25 GTW Technology 54 October 4, 2005 YES 
26 OSIP Health Care 54 December 9, 2005 YES 
27 SEIC Financials 46.3 December 15, 2005 YES 
28 AA Materials 45 November 16, 2005 YES 
29 SLXP Health Care 43.7 January 5, 2006 YES 
30 AMKR Technology 43 July 1, 2004 NO 
31 AGR Technology 42 October 5, 2005 YES 
32 IVX Health Care 39.3 December 22, 2004 YES 
33 MSCC Technology 36 August 1, 2005 YES 
34 UIS Technology 33.7 September 23, 2005 YES 
35 AMD Technology 33 May 4, 2005 YES 
36 ADRX Health Care 32 March 8, 2005 YES 
37 IMCL Health Care 32 December 21, 2005  YES 
38 XRX Technology 31 May 20, 2005 YES 
39 COCO Consumer 30 July 7, 2005 YES 
40 MAT Consumer 30 December 29, 2005 YES 
41 TAP Consumer Staples 29 December 23, 2005 YES 
42 IPG Consumer 28.2 December 22, 2005 YES 
43 VRSN Technology 27.7 January 5, 2006 YES 
44 FCS Technology 27 February 25, 2005 YES 
45 SLR Technology 26 February 28, 2005 YES 
46 SGTL Technology 25.9 December 22, 2005 YES 
47 PLT Technology 25.6 March 10, 2005 YES 
48 LXK Technology 25 January 4, 2006 YES 
49 MYGN Health Care 25 April 15, 2005 YES 
50 NVLS Technology 24.3 November 15, 2005 YES 
51 MNST Industrials 24 December 20, 2005 YES 
52 HEW Technology 23.8 June 14, 2005 YES 
53 MDCO Health Care 22.2 December 28, 2005  YES   
54 DAN Consumer 22 December 6, 2005 YES 
55 DY Technology 21.9 July 22, 2005 YES 
56 BRKS Technology 21.6 December 28, 2004 YES 
57 CIEN Technology 21.5 October 28, 2005 YES 
58 ASO Financials 21 December 30, 2005 NO 
59 IWOV Technology 21 October 7, 2005 YES 
60 AGIL Technology 20 May 3, 2005 YES 
61 ISPH Health Care 20 December 14, 2005 YES 
62 TECD Technology 20 March 2, 2005 YES 
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Table 2 
  
Bear Stearns 749 Company 
Population My 62 Company Sample 
Information Technology 33% 55% 
Health Care 19% 21% 
Financials 16% 5% 
Consumer Discretionary 15% 11% 
Consumer Staples 2% 2% 
Industrials 10% 5% 
Materials 2% 2% 
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Table 3  
Abnormal Returns Vs Market Returns  
  
Mean 0.000504097 
Standard Error 0.006119078 
Median 0.000912503 
Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 0.048181672 
Sample Variance 0.002321474 
Kurtosis 22.33073599 
Skewness -3.179423106 
Range 0.434736813 
Minimum -0.289503012 
Maximum 0.1452338 
Sum 0.031253999 
Count 62 
Largest(1) 0.1452338 
Smallest(1) -0.289503012 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.012235853 
  
T-stat 0.082381157 
 
Table 4  
 
Abnormal Returns: Underwater Vs In the Money 
   
  
Abnormal Return for 
Underwater 
Abnormal return for In the 
Money 
Mean 0.005517399 -0.046286724 
Variance 0.001000736 0.014405134 
Observations 56 6 
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 5  
t Stat 1.053345853  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.170200327  
t Critical one-tail 2.015048372  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.340400655  
t Critical two-tail 2.570581835   
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Table 5  
Percentage of Market Cap Accelerated 
  
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.123392076 
R Square 0.015225604 
Adjusted R Square -0.001187302 
Standard Error 0.048210266 
Observations 62 
 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -0.005390084 0.008656679 -0.62265 0.535874 
$ Accelerated / Market 
Cap 0.277491574 0.288107973 0.963151 0.339337 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
